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The International Criminal Court and
Co-operation: Introductory Note
CARSTEN STAHN AND VOLKER NERLICH∗
Co-operation has proved to be one of the greatest challenges in the ﬁrst practice
of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Court cannot fulﬁl its mandate
effectively without co-operation from states, international organizations, and other
actors. The Prosecutor requires co-operation and assistance at various stages of
proceedings (preliminary examination, investigation, judicial proceedings) in order
to conduct investigations and prosecutions. The Court depends on the co-operation
of states to execute the warrants of arrest and proceed to trial. In the context of
its ﬁrst practice, the Court has operated in situations of ongoing conﬂict and/or
environments where the security situation is volatile. The level and modalities of
co-operation were inﬂuenced by the factual and political conditions on the ground
and the institutional support of other entities (e.g. the United Nations).
Co-operation has thus been at the top of the ICC’s agenda. The Prosecutor ad-
dressed the importance of co-operation and the corresponding obligations of states
in his Nuremberg address. He argued that states that ‘do not actively support the
Court’ in carrying out arrests ‘are actively undermining it’.1 Similarly, the president
of the ICC highlighted in his 2007 report to the UN General Assembly that if states
fail to co-operatewith theCourt, trialswill not be possible and ‘victimswill again be
denied justice and potential perpetrators will be encouraged to commit new crimes
with impunity’.2
The Bureau produced a report on co-operation3 with draft recommendations
to states in areas such as diplomatic and public support, support of analysis, in-
vestigations, prosecutions, judicial proceedings, arrest and surrender, and witness
protection. These recommendationswere adopted by the Assembly of States Parties
at its sixth session in December 2007.4
The following contributions take a closer look at the legal and policy aspects
of co-operation. Rod Rastan provides an account of the legal parameters of the co-
operation regime and its application in the ﬁrst jurisprudence and practice of the
Court. He argues that support for justice and co-operation must be theorized under
the umbrella of a notional responsibility to enforce.
∗ Editor and co-editor of the International Criminal Court section of the LJIL.
1. See Luis Moreno Ocampo, ‘Building a Future on Peace and Justice’, speech, Nuremberg, 24–5 June 2007,
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/speeches/LMO_nuremberg_20070625_English.pdf.
2. See Philippe Kirsch, ‘Address to the United Nations General Assembly, 1 November 2007’, available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/presidency/PK_20071101_ENG.pdf, at p. 5.
3. See ICC, Assembly of States Parties, Report of the Bureau on Co-operation, 19 October 2007, ICC-ASP/6/21.
4. See ICC, Assembly of States Parties, Omnibus Resolution, ICC-ASP/6/Res.2 of 14 December 2007.
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Steven Roper and Lillian Barria undertake an impact-based assessment of co-
operation in the context of the ﬁrst situations under investigation. They analyse
the broader socio-political factorswhichmay inﬂuence the bargaining power of the
ICC. This analysis culminates in the development of a matrix of factors which may
shape the capacity of the ICC to secure arrest and surrender.
Bill Burke-White challenges some of the elements of this matrix in his response
to Roper and Barria’s article. Building on game theory, he develops a tripartitemodel
(‘three-level game’), which involves three interrelated dimensions of bargaining:
negotiationwith the territorial state, negotiationwith third states and international
organizations, and direct negotiation with domestic actors.
The three contributions provide a vivid account of the practical and theoretical
challenges of co-operation in the emerging practice of the Court. It is our hope that
they will generate further research in this (widely unexplored) area.
